6月初,在这个Blog中提到了Ryan Allis上了CNBC,这两天,他的公司iContact宣布已获得
6月初,在这个Blog中提到了Ryan Allis上了CNBC,这两天,他的公司iContact宣布已获得
总结:不要让你的投资人来决定期权池的大小。运用一个招聘计划来证明一个小期权池才是合理的,提升每股价格,并提高你的实际估值。
如果你在进行估值谈判时,没有密切关注期权池,你的投资人会跟你玩(让你输)一个我们称之为期权池猜牌的游戏。
假定你选择了著名的Blue Shirt Capital而放弃了Herd Mentality Management,成功地谈判获得了投资前(pre-money)估值6M美金,投资2M美金。你以胜利者的姿态回到你精心装饰的阁楼或是废弃车库办公室,告诉你的团队他们的辛苦工作创造了8M美金的价值。
"How can we be so far apart on price?" is the common lament of venture-backed companies who find themselves with an acquisition offer. Here's the view of one of my clients, a US company who has been an active acquiror of early stage industry players:
In the public markets, software companies are valued at predictable multiples, this acquiror says. Companies that aren't profitable trade at 1x revenue; companies that are growing, but not profitable - 2x revenues; companies that are growing and profitable - 3x revenues. By contrast, startups and their VCs are looking for purchase prices that yield 4-5X return on invested capital, minimum, regardless of revenue. Is this acceptable?
我第一次跟风险投资家(VC,venturecapitalist)打交道是在1987年,当时对他们的印象不是很好,但在跟他们接触的过程中我却发现了创业公司暴露出的很多普遍性问题。自那之后,我参与创办了30多家公司,做过创始人、顾问、工程师、管理人员以及董事,那比过去仅仅充当“媒人”(为做技术的工程师与有钱的风险投资家结成“姻缘”而“穿针引线”)要复杂多了,在从事这个行当的过程中我自然也形成了一些观点和看法。